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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                            __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
         In this discrimination case tried pursuant to the New 
Jersey Law Against Discrimination, the jury found that Evelyn 
Delli Santi proved by a preponderance of the evidence that CNA 
Insurance Company discharged her in retaliation for her 
complaints of age and sex discrimination.  The jury specifically 
rejected CNA's assertion that it discharged Delli Santi because 
she allegedly inflated her gasoline expense records.  
Nonetheless, the district court granted CNA's motion for judgment 
as a matter of law and conditionally granted its motion for a new 
trial, holding that CNA proved as an affirmative defense that, 
despite retaliatory intent, it would have discharged Delli Santi 
in any event. 
         We find that, under these specific circumstances of the 
jury's rejection of the non-discriminatory reason proffered by 
the defense, the court could not utilize this evidence against 
the plaintiff.  Therefore, since there was legally sufficient 
evidence to support the jury's verdict, we will vacate the 
district court's judgment as a matter of law on the affirmative 
defense for CNA.  We will also vacate the district court's 
conditional grant of a new trial because, based upon our review 
of the record, the verdict was not against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
         We will, however, affirm the district court's order 
granting CNA a new trial unless Delli Santi agrees to accept a 
remittitur of the jury's excessive pain and suffering award.  
Therefore, we will return this case to the district court for 
entry of judgment on the jury verdict, including the jury's front 




         In 1951, Evelyn Delli Santi began her employment as a 
typist clerk with The American Casualty Insurance Company, which 
eventually merged with CNA.  By the mid-1960s, she was a first- 
party claims handler.  CNA continued to promote Delli Santi and, 
ultimately, she became a claims representative.  Although CNA's 
home office is located in Chicago, Illinois, Delli Santi reported 
to the Cedar Knolls, New Jersey branch office, part of CNA's 
eastern region.   
         Delli Santi first complained about discrimination 
during an employee communication session ("ECS") with Richard 
Farah, a New Jersey branch claims manager, in October 1986.  
According to Delli Santi, she told Farah that her supervisors in 
the past informed her that the company would not promote her 
above grade level 34 until she came in from her field position.  
When Farah told her this was untrue and there were two men in 
field positions at grade level 36 (a higher level), Delli Santi 
stated:  "[T]hat's pretty good.  I said, that's discrimination, I 
says, sex and age. . . .  And I told him, I didn't think the 
company really cared about promoting women because I had a 
problem once before, as you heard early on, when we merged, and I 
didn't think it was right." 
         In April 1987, Delli Santi complained of discrimination 
to Dennis McCarthy, her immediate supervisor, at her annual 
performance review.  Dissatisfied with CNA's failure to promote 
her along with male counterparts in the field, she said, "[T]here 
you go, there it is, discrimination.  I said, this is not fair, 
and I'm not happy at all with this situation."  According to 
Delli Santi, McCarthy told her that she should talk to Farah 
about her complaints.  
         The third discrimination complaint arose one week later 
in another ECS meeting with Farah.  There Delli Santi voiced her 
disapproval about the refusal to promote her to grade level 36, 
stating "[A]s far as I'm concerned it's more discrimination, 
harassment, age and sex discrimination, and its not right, and 
I'm not happy with it at all."   
         After making these complaints, Delli Santi's expense 
reports were called into question.  Delli Santi's gas mileage 
and the number of handwritten receipts for her May expense report 
were substantially the same as they were in three previous 
expense submissions that McCarthy and Farah had reviewed and 
approved for the last half of March and all of April 1987.  When 
Delli Santi submitted her expense reports for May 1987, however, 
McCarthy took exception to the amount reported for gas purchases 
because "the numbers were a little bit off."  Delli Santi's May 
1987 expense reports reflected fifteen gasoline purchases during 
a thirty-one day period in which she drove less than 800 miles.  
Only four of the gasoline purchases were documented by 
identifiable service station receipts.  The remaining eleven 
purchases were documented by Delli Santi's own "in lieu of" 
vouchers, which had handwritten dollar amounts and dates, an 
acceptable alternative to service station receipts.   
         Subsequently, CNA conducted an internal investigation 
into Delli Santi's expense accounts.  Based upon the results of 
this investigation, CNA concluded that Delli Santi had inflated 
her expense accounts.  On September 16, 1987, CNA terminated 
Delli Santi after thirty-six years of employment ostensibly 
because she misrepresented her gas expenses for her company car.  
At the time Delli Santi was 59 years old. 
         In October 1988, Delli Santi filed a multi-count 
complaint in a New Jersey state court against CNA and Farah.  
Delli Santi's original complaint included claims pursuant to both 
the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 
U.S.C.  621-634 (1994) and the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination ("LAD"), N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-12d (West Supp. 
1994).  CNA removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  Prior to trial, however, Delli Santi 
abandoned her ADEA claim.  Consequently, after the district court 
disposed of all pre-trial motions, the sole issue for the jury to 
decide was whether the evidence supported Delli Santi's LAD 
retaliation claim.  This claim was tried to a jury from January 
20 to February 10, 1994. 
         At trial, Delli Santi argued that CNA singled her out 
for termination, not because she falsified her expense accounts, 
but because she had complained about discrimination.  In support, 
Delli Santi relied, inter alia, upon the following stipulation, 
which was read to the jury: 
         According to the CNA fleet reports, from 
         January 1985 through March 1988, 215 persons 
         achieved a mileage of less than 10 miles per 
         gallon in one of the 13 quarters reported.  
         Of those persons, 31 had a reported mileage 
         of less than 10 miles per gallon in more than 
         one reporting quarter. 
 
App. at 1090. 
         In addition to the above stipulation, Delli Santi 
pointed to the following October 27, 1987 internal CNA memo, 
which was issued to all fleet services managers: 
         We have discovered situations such as 
         vehicles consistently averaging less than 10 
         miles per gallon (our fleet averages 23+ 
         m.p.g.) . . . .  In some instances, these 
         conditions have existed for several quarters 
         which is an indication that drivers are not 
         being counseled. 
 
App. at 326.  Although the memo advised managers to "counsel" 
these drivers, there was no directive to investigate, discipline 
or terminate any of them. 
         The memo referring to widespread instances of arguably 
suspicious low mileage similar to Delli Santi's was also 
distributed to David Koester, senior vice president of 
administration, who testified at trial that no action whatsoever 
was taken against these drivers.  Indeed, Koester and Kent 
Crassweller, an investigation manager, conceded that they were 
not aware of anyone -- except Delli Santi -- who was 
investigated, disciplined or terminated for reporting low gas 
mileage.  Koester's testimony, however, is at odds with his 
statement that any fleet driver reporting under ten miles per 
gallon should have been investigated because "it's an indicator 
of some issue." 
         At trial, CNA introduced the following evidence.  
Larry Schroeder, the Chicago corporate security manager, reviewed 
Delli Santi's May expense report and decided to open an 
investigation.  Schroeder stated that he opened the Delli Santi 
investigation because the handwritten vouchers, coupled with the 
low mileage, were "strange."  Accordingly, in June 1987 
Crassweller, an investigation manager, and Kathy Foster, a 
regional personnel manager, interviewed Delli Santi, asking her 
to explain the handwritten receipts.  Delli Santi stated that she 
wrote them herself on receipt pads from her brother's business.  
When questioned about her gas mileage, Delli Santi stated that 
the car "gets what it gets" and explained that (1) she sometimes 
would allow her car to idle (running the air conditioner or 
heater depending on the season); (2) children might be stealing 
gas from her car; and (3) the car "ran rough."  Following the 
interview, Crassweller reported this conversation to Schroeder 
and Robert Keith, corporate security manager. 
         Crassweller then returned to Chicago and supervised a 
review of several of Delli Santi's past expense reports, which 
revealed the following:  if Delli Santi's handwritten generic 
receipts were totally discounted and her gasoline calculated 
solely on the basis of verifiable service station receipts, the 
gasoline mileage for her 1984 Dodge Aries K would have been 
eighteen miles per gallon for the first quarter of 1986; twenty- 
four miles per gallon for the third quarter of 1986; seventeen 
miles per gallon for the fourth quarter of 1986; and sixteen 
miles per gallon for the first quarter of 1987.  These averages 
were consistent with the estimated mileage of twenty-three miles 
per gallon for her vehicle and the company's fleet-wide average 
of approximately twenty-three-and-a-half miles per gallon.   
         The investigation into Delli Santi's expense reports, 
over a period of more than three years, revealed an inverse 
relationship between the average number of handwritten receipts 
submitted per expense period and gasoline mileage.  In 1984, 
Delli Santi averaged eleven to thirteen miles per gallon, with an 
average of two to three handwritten receipts per expense period; 
in 1985, she averaged about ten miles per gallon, with an average 
of three to four handwritten receipts; in 1986, she was getting 
about seven miles per gallon, with an average of four handwritten 
receipts per expense period; and, finally, in 1987, Delli Santi 
got only six miles per gallon, with an average of five 
handwritten receipts per expense period. 
         CNA's corporate security manager, Robert Keith, stated 
that he was "highly suspicious" and believed Delli Santi was 
stealing, but he was reluctant to terminate Delli Santi without 
first affording her the benefit of the doubt.  Because Delli 
Santi had stated at the outset of the investigation that the car 
"ran rough," Keith decided to have her car test driven.  
Accordingly, Farah directed Leonard Polizzi, a manager in another 
CNA office, to test drive the car and keep a record of the gas 
mileage.  Polizzi drove Delli Santi's car back and forth to his 
office, a round trip of eighty miles per day, and reported that 
the car had given him twenty-four to twenty-seven miles per 
gallon with no mechanical problems.  Because Polizzi performed 
the test drive generally under highway conditions, the test drive 
may not have duplicated Delli Santi's exact driving conditions.   
         Keith testified nonetheless that the test drive results 
confirmed his belief that Delli Santi used inflated expense 
accounts to steal.  He immediately reported this belief to his 
superior David Koester, senior vice president of administration, 
and Carolyn Murphy, senior vice president of field operations.  
Koester and Murphy, who are both located in Chicago, agreed with 
Keith.  
         After reviewing the recommendations, Meyer and Keith 
discussed the matter.  Keith told Meyer that he had already 
discussed the matter with Koester and Murphy and had informed 
Meyer that the penalty for employee theft at CNA was uniform and 
unyielding:  mandatory termination.  Specifically, Keith 
testified: 
         [W]e do not make exceptions to our policy and 
         practice of terminating people who either lie 
         to us, or who steal from us.  We don't make 
         an exception.  We never have, we can't make 
         an exception for the reason of, there has to 
         be fairness and consistency, and people need 
         to understand the rules, and that's what 
         we've done in the past, and that's what we'll 
         continue to do in the future.  It's the only 
         way we can run a company. 
 
App. at 1375. 
         At the close of this evidence, on February 10, 1994, 
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Delli Santi.  Answering 
specific interrogatories, the jury found:  that Delli Santi 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that CNA discharged her 
in retaliation for her complaints about discrimination; and that 
CNA failed to prove that, even though it terminated Delli Santi 
in retaliation for her complaints about discrimination, CNA would 
have discharged her in any event for stealing.  The jury returned 
a $627,866 award for compensatory damages, assessing $300,000 for 
pain and suffering.  The district court declined to submit the 
issue of punitive damages to the jury.  On February 22, the 
district court entered judgment on the jury verdict. 
         Subsequently the district court entered a post-judgment 
order granting judgment as a matter of law in CNA's favor because 
the court agreed with CNA's claim that it would have discharged 
Delli Santi, regardless of retaliatory intent, due to CNA's 
discovery that CNA had allegedly falsified her expense accounts.  
In addition to granting judgment as a matter of law on this 
claim, the district court conditionally granted a new trial.  
Further, the district court conditionally granted a new trial 
based upon damages unless Delli Santi accepted a remittitur of 
the pain and suffering award from $300,000 to $5,000.  The 
district court granted CNA's motion for a remittitur on the basis 
of future earnings totaling $152,266 because it found that Delli 
Santi was ineligible for reinstatement with CNA.  Finally, the 
district court denied, without prejudice, Delli Santi's 
application for pre-judgment interest and request for counsel 
fees and expenses.  Both parties filed timely notices of appeal. 
 
                               II. 
         The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination "makes 
retaliatory discrimination an unlawful employment practice."  
Jamison v. Rockaway Township. Bd. of Educ., 577 A.2d 177, 182 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).  An unlawful employment 
practice occurs when a person, whether an employer or employee, 
takes "reprisals against any person because that person has 
opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act or because 
that person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any 
proceeding under this act."  N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-12d. 
         To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an 
employee must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he 
or she "engaged in a protected activity known to the employer;" 
(2) he or she thereafter was "subjected to [an] adverse 
employment decision by the employer;" and (3) there was a "causal 
link" between the protected activity and adverse employment 
decision.  Jamison, 577 A.2d at 182 (citing Wrighten v. 
Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984) 
and Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., Inc., 536 A.2d 237, 238 
n.1 (N.J. 1988)); accord Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 
A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. 1995) (citing Jamison, 577 A.2d 177 and 
Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1354); Wachstein v. Slocum, 625 A.2d 527, 
534 (N.J. Super. App. Div.), certif. denied, 636 A.2d 521 (N.J. 
1993); see also Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 
F.2d 892, 895 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993); Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 
F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 (1991); Jalil 
v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 1023 (1990). 
         Once an employee succeeds in showing these facts, he or 
she establishes a prima facie case of retaliation and the burden 
of production (although not the burden of persuasion) "shifts to 
the employer to articulate some legitimate non-retaliatory reason 
for the adverse action."  Jamison, 577 A.2d at 182 (citing 
Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1354).  If the employer comes forward with 
evidence showing some legitimate non-retaliatory reason, the 
employee still has the opportunity to produce evidence sufficient 
to persuade the factfinder by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the employer nevertheless harbored a discriminatory intent.  
Id.  An employee can make this showing by producing evidence and 
proving to the factfinder's satisfaction that "the articulated 
reason is a pretext for the retaliation or that a discriminatory 
reason more likely motivated the employer."  Id. (citing 
Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1354 (citing Texas Dep't. of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). 
         Assuming the employee meets this burden, a presumption 
arises under New Jersey law "that the adverse employment action 
was the product of improper retaliatory intent."  Id. (citing 
Wrighten 726 F.2d at 1354).  Then "the employer must prove by the 
preponderance of the evidence that the adverse action would have 
been taken regardless of retaliatory intent."  Id. (citing 
Wrighten, 726 F.2d at 1354).  But see Jalil, 873 F.2d at 706 
(ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with the employee 
who seeks to prove a retaliation claim). 
                                A. 
         At trial, CNA moved for judgment as a matter of law at 
the close of Delli Santi's case and again at the close of all the 
evidence, arguing that Delli Santi had not adduced sufficient 
evidence to meet either her prima facie burden or her burden of 
proving pretext.  On cross-appeal, CNA asks us to review the 
district court's denial of its motion which sought judgment that 
CNA had not discharged Delli Santi out of retaliation for her 
complaints of discrimination. 
         We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
order granting a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of 
law.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (citing Wittekamp v. Gulf & Western, Inc., 991 F.2d 
1137, 1141 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 309 (1993)).  Our 
role is to determine "whether the evidence and justifiable 
inferences most favorable to the [non-moving] party afford any 
rational basis for the verdict."  Anastasio v. Schering Corp., 
838 F.2d 701, 705 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Bhaya v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., 832 F.2d 258, 259 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 1004 (1989)); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 
372 (3d Cir. 1987).    
         In our view, Delli Santi presented sufficient evidence 
to allow a rational jury to find that her supervisors (who were 
aware of her discrimination complaints) possessed a retaliatory 
intent and, thus, tainted the ultimate decision.  For years 
Delli Santi submitted expense reports indicating low gas mileage 
without incident.  In fact, in February 1986, Farah (who at the 
time was substituting for Powell) approved Delli Santi's expense 
report even though she reported less than five miles per gallon.  
He and McCarthy thereafter approved Delli Santi's gas 
expenditures on three separate occasions (the last half of March 
and all of April 1987) when she reported gas mileage well under 
ten miles per gallon.  So, too, Franceschini approved Delli 
Santi's expense reports in December 1986 and January 1987 even 
though she reported less than ten miles per gallon.  The reports 
approved by McCarthy, Farah and Franceschini did not differ 
significantly from her May 1987 expense report.  It was only 
after Delli Santi voiced concerns about discrimination that CNA 
decided to investigate her gas expense reports because the 
numbers, which were the same for years, were now "a little bit 
off."   
         We also find that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's finding that CNA's proffered reason for Delli 
Santi's termination was pretextual.  Despite Koester's statement 
that CNA had a policy of investigating drivers reporting less 
than ten miles per gallon, "there was uncontested evidence of 
CNA's inertia in the face of its knowledge that some 215 
employees had achieved mileage of less than 10 miles per gallon.  
Of these, 31 had reported mileage of less than 10 miles per 
gallon in more than one reporting period."  See Delli Santi, No. 
88-5137, slip op. at 15-16.  A CNA internal memorandum reported 
that CNA was aware of drivers "consistently averaging less than 
10 miles per gallon" and, "[i]n some instances, these conditions 
have existed for several quarters"; yet, Koester "was unaware of 
any driver who reported less than ten miles per gallon ever being 
investigated by Corporate Security or ever being terminated for 
misrepresentation of his gas expenses."  Id. at 16. 
         Thus, there was ample evidence from which the jury 
could infer that CNA singled out Delli Santi given that it did 
not investigate, discipline or terminate any other employee who 
reported low gas mileage.  Accordingly, the district court did 
not err in denying CNA's motion for judgment as a matter of law 
based on its retaliation claim. 
 
                                B. 
         On the basis of this evidence, however, the district 
court conditionally granted CNA a new trial on Delli Santi's 
retaliation claim.  In reviewing the district court's decision to 
set aside the verdict as against the clear weight of the 
evidence, we "exercise a closer degree of scrutiny and 
supervision" because this case deals with "material which is 
familiar and simple, . . . lying well within the comprehension of 
[the] jurors. . . ."  Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (internal quotes omitted) (ellipses and alteration in 
original).  Because the subject matter of this case "is simple 
and within a layman's understanding," we give the district court 
"less freedom to scrutinize the jury's verdict than in a case 
that deals with complex factual determinations."  Id. (internal 
quote omitted).  
         With respect to the court's ruling that the verdict was 
against the clear weight of the evidence, we caution that the 
district court ought only to grant a new trial on this basis 
where "a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were 
to stand."  Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 
171, 211 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Williamson v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir. 1991)).  We have observed 
that "[t]his limit upon the district court's power to grant a new 
trial seeks to ensure that a district court does not substitute 
its `judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses 
for that of the jury'."  Id. (quoting Lind v. Schenley Indus., 
Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 
835 (1960)).  "Such an action effects a denigration of the jury 
system and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge 
takes over, if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury 
as the trier of facts."  Id.  With this standard of review in 
mind, we turn to the merits of the new trial motion.   
         In considering CNA's motion for a new trial, the 
district court decided that Delli Santi presented sufficient 
evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.  
Nevertheless, without repudiating its earlier determination (on 
CNA's motion for judgment as a matter of law) that Delli Santi 
"generated enough speculation in the eyes of the jury to allow 
them to dismiss CNA's explanation as pretext," Delli Santi, No. 
88-5137, slip op. at 17, the district court concluded that the 
jury's finding of pretext was against the weight of the 
evidence.   
         We believe that the jury could have rationally inferred 
that the Chicago decision-makers -- Koester, Keith, and Murphy -- 
were not the effective decision-makers, but rather their decision 
to fire Delli Santi was influenced by her managers in New Jersey.  
Though CNA terminated Delli Santi on September 16, 1987, after 
McCarthy, Farah, Franceschini, Foster, Meyer, and Ottinger had 
signed Delli Santi's termination notice, neither Koester nor 
Murphy signed the internal termination document until about one 
week later.  Koester's own testimony buttressed this post- 
termination approval when he admitted that he did not sign the 
internal termination document until September 22, 1987.  Keith 
conceded on cross-examination that no relevant documents 
suggested that Koester and Murphy took part in the decision- 
making process before September 22, 1987, six days after Delli 
Santi's termination.  Ottinger, moreover, testified that once 
Meyer announced his decision to approve Delli Santi's termination 
at a late August 1987 meeting, which Koester, Keith, and Murphy 
did not attend, the firing would have occurred by the next day 
except for the fact that Delli Santi was on vacation.  Thus, the 
jury had an entirely rational basis for concluding that the 
Chicago decision-makers did not base their decision "completely 
on the basis of the investigation by Corporate Security" and 
their "overwhelming reasonable belief that Delli Santi was 
stealing from the company through the submission of fraudulent 
expense reports," see Delli Santi, No. 88-5137, slip op. at 30, 
but instead that her termination was the product of a retaliatory 
animus on the part of her New Jersey branch office supervisors. 
         In addition, the memorandum and the stipulation 
indicating CNA's failure to investigate, terminate or otherwise 
discipline any other employee who appeared to inflate gas 
purchases support the jury's finding that the articulated reason 
for discharging Delli Santi was a pretext.  Although the district 
court recognized that Delli Santi could defeat CNA's motion for a 
conditional grant of a new trial if she "prove[d] that she was 
singled out; that others had submitted the same or substantially 
similar expense reports and had not been disciplined in a like 
manner," the court failed to consider other substantial evidence; 
namely, that for almost fourteen years Delli Santi had submitted 
similar reports without anyone questioning her gas expenditures, 
that Farah and McCarthy initiated the so-called "investigation" 
into Delli Santi's expense reports only after she had complained 
to them about sex and age discrimination, that over two hundred 
other drivers similarly reported under ten miles per gallon of 
gas, and over thirty fleet drivers did so in more than one 
reporting period.  CNA, however, never disciplined, investigated, 
or terminated a single employee for the same reason it terminated 
Delli Santi. 
         The district court should not have required Delli Santi 
to prove "selective enforcement of CNA's policy against employee 
theft."  Instead, Delli Santi met her burden of showing that the 
company did not enforce such a policy by the evidence that other 
employees were claiming excessive gasoline expenses without any 
fear of investigation or repercussion, nor especially, 
termination.  The jury, by drawing reasonable inferences from the 
evidence adduced at trial, could rationally conclude that the 
legitimate non-retaliatory reason offered by CNA was a pretext 
for discharging Delli Santi.  We, therefore, conclude that the 
grant of a new trial was not consistent with a sound exercise of 
discretion since the jury's finding of pretext was supported by 
the clear weight of the evidence.   
 
                                C. 
         Although the district court found that Delli Santi met 
her burden of proving retaliatory discharge, the district court 
held that CNA was nonetheless entitled, after the jury verdict 
and as an "affirmative defense", to argue to the court that 
although there may have been retaliatory intent in her 
termination, Delli Santi would still have been dismissed in any 
event due to her fraudulent expense submissions. 
         A district court should enter judgment for an employer 
as a matter of law on its "affirmative defense" "only if the 
record shows that [the employer] established the defense so 
clearly that no rational jury could have found to the contrary."  
E.E.O.C. v. State of Del. Dept. of Health and Social Servs., 865 
F.2d 1408, 1414 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. 
Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977), and Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 427 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1970)) 
(footnote omitted).  Here, too, "we must view the evidence most 
favorably to [the employee] and accord [her] the benefit of all 
justifiable inferences."  Id. (citing Bhaya, 832 F.2d at 259 and 
Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987)). 
         In granting CNA's motion for a judgment as a matter of 
law on its "affirmative defense," the court reasoned that the 
ultimate decision-makers (Koester, Keith, and Murphy) were 
unaware of any retaliatory intent and, given the "overwhelming 
evidence of Delli Santi's theft," coupled with CNA's policy to 
terminate those employees who it believed were stealing, there 
was no evidence "from which a jury could have rationally inferred 
that CNA would not terminate an employee who the company believed 
was engaging in expense account misrepresentation."  Delli Santi, 
No. 88-5137, slip op. at 25-26.   
         We cannot agree with the district court's statement 
that "[t]here was no evidence from which a jury could have 
rationally inferred that CNA would not terminate an employee who 
the company believed was engaging in expense account 
misrepresentation."  Delli Santi, No. 88-5137, slip op. at 25-26.  
In so concluding, we are drawn again to the stipulation that over 
200 CNA employees were reporting mileage of less than ten miles 
per gallon and CNA's awareness of this fact as evidenced by the 
October 27, 1987, internal memorandum conceding that these 
drivers were not being counseled.  See supra pp. 7-8.   
         With this evidence, a jury could have rationally 
inferred that CNA was singling out Delli Santi based upon her 
discrimination claims because it failed to investigate, 
discipline or terminate any other employee (over 200 of them) for 
unexplainably low gas mileage, which, as stated by Koester, "is 
an indicator of some issue."  Because Koester and Crassweller 
admitted during trial that they were not aware of CNA 
investigating, disciplining, or terminating persons other than 
Delli Santi for reporting excessively low gas mileage, the jury 
could conclude both that low gas mileage was "an indicator of 
some issue" only because Delli Santi voiced discrimination claims 
and that CNA's policy against company theft did not dictate Delli 
Santi's (or anyone else's) termination for inflating gas 
expenditures.   
         Our conclusion is further supported by the evidence 
that, to the time of trial, CNA had failed to enforce its policy 
against expense account fraud.  A CNA employee, Harold Ronin, 
stated that even though CNA fleet records accurately reflected 
drivers reporting under ten miles per gallon, he had no intention 
whatsoever of sending their names to corporate security for 
possible investigation.  Thus, despite Keith's admonition that 
CNA does not "make exceptions to [its] policy and practice of 
terminating people who either lie to us, or who steal from us," a 
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the evidence of 
fraudulent gas expense reports would not have led to Delli 
Santi's termination on legitimate grounds.   
         Finally, we consider whether the district court erred 
when it conditionally granted CNA a new trial on its "affirmative 
defense."  Our reasoning here follows that which we have 
already stated in reversing the district court's order granting 
CNA's motion for judgment as a matter of law on this "affirmative 
defense."  Briefly, we hold that CNA failed to meet its burden of 
persuasion on this issue because the jury rejected outright CNA's 
assertion that Delli Santi was discharged for theft.  Indeed, 
once the jury found that CNA's proffered reason for Delli Santi's 
discharge (employee theft) was a pretext, the district court 
could not later rely on this reason, raised as an affirmative 
defense in a post-verdict motion.  Once again, on the basis of 
this record, we cannot say that the verdict was against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
          
                               III. 
         After the jury's verdict for Delli Santi, the district 
court also entered judgment for CNA as a matter of law on the 
issue of whether Delli Santi was ineligible for future employment 
or front pay because of her alleged theft.  The district court 
relied upon Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel and Casino, 828 F. 
Supp. 314 (D.N.J. 1993), where the court held that an employer 
who unlawfully discharges an employee could use after-acquired 
evidence (which would have led to the employee's termination on 
lawful and legitimate grounds) "to bar the specific remedies of 
reinstatement and front-pay if the employer demonstrates that, 
based solely on that misconduct, it would have made the same 
employment decision regarding that employee."  Id. at 328.  The 
court in Massey reasoned that "to require employers to reinstate 
or provide front-pay to an employee today that they can now fire 
legitimately tomorrow would be nonsensical."  Id. at 323.  SeeMcKennon v. 
Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 
(1995) (where employer discovers after termination, that employee 
engaged in wrongdoing, generally "neither reinstatement nor front 
pay is an appropriate remedy"). 
         We find that the district court erred by allowing CNA 
to assert as an "affirmative defense" its claim that Delli Santi 
was ineligible for front pay because this case does not involve 
after-acquired evidence.  In Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. 
Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogated by McKennon, 
115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), we distinguished an after-acquired 
evidence case by stating: 
         What sets an after-acquired evidence case far 
         apart from a mixed-motives case like Price 
         Waterhouse or a pretext case like McDonnell 
         Douglas is that the articulated "legitimate" 
         reason, which was non-existent at the time of 
         the adverse decision, could not possibly have 
         motivated the employer to the slightest 
         degree.  After-acquired evidence, simply put, 
         is not relevant in establishing liability 
         under Title VII or ADEA because the sole 
         question to be answered at that stage is 
         whether the employer discriminated against 
         the employee on the basis of an impermissible 
         factor at the instant of the adverse 
         employment action. 
 
Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1228.  Here, CNA's articulated reason (that 
Delli Santi allegedly inflated her gas receipts) was known to CNA 
at the time of the adverse action; indeed, CNA claims that it was 
the very reason for the discharge.  Delli Santi's alleged 
wrongdoing did not arise after the fact but, instead, allegedly 
motivated CNA to discharge her in the first instance.  
         This case is unlike the case where a different and 
legitimate reason for discharge is discovered by the employer 
after its adverse employment action for another reason as well.  
Here, CNA's stated reason for Delli Santi's discharge, theft, was 
specifically rejected by the jury.  By its own findings, the jury 
expressed its disbelief that in the absence of a retaliatory 
motive CNA would have made the same decision to discharge Delli 
Santi.  Instead, the jury drew the opposite inference (based upon 
the evidence that CNA did not investigate, discipline or 
terminate any other employee who was reporting low gas mileage 
and CNA's internal memorandum stating that these drivers should 
be counseled) that Delli Santi would not have been discharged for 
stealing.  Accordingly, we will reinstate the jury's award of 
$152,266 representing Delli Santi's front pay. 
                                IV. 
         Under the LAD, an employee can recover damages for pain 
and suffering.  N.J. Stat. Ann.  10:5-3; Catalane v. Gilian 
Instrument Corp., 638 A.2d 1341, 1353 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div.), certif. denied, 642 A.2d 1006 (N.J. 1994).  To recover 
these damages, an employee does not need to present either expert 
testimony or objective corroboration.  See Rendine v. Pantzer, 
648 A.2d at 245; see also Bolden v. Septa, 21 F.3d 29, 34 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (expert medical testimony is not required to prove 
damages for emotional distress in a case brought under  1983).  
We hasten to add, however, that "New Jersey courts have been 
careful to award such damages only in cases where the record 
demonstrates a `substantial basis for compensation.'"  Abrams v. 
Lightolier, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 584, 593 (D.N.J. 1994) (quoting 
Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 400 A.2d 1182, 1184 (N.J. 
1979)), aff'd, 50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir. 1995). 
         Here, the jury awarded Delli Santi $300,000 for pain 
and suffering.  The district court, however, conditionally 
granted CNA a new trial on damages if Delli Santi refused to 
accept a remittitur of the pain and suffering award from $300,000 
to $5,000, reasoning that although "Delli Santi's testimony 
supported an award for pain and suffering it did not support one 
so large."  Delli Santi, No. 88-5137, slip op. at 40-41.   
         Delli Santi argues that the district court overlooked 
substantial evidence when it concluded that her testimony did not 
support an emotional damage award "so large," id. at 41, namely, 
the humiliation and emotional damages flowing from the loss of 
her reputation.  At trial Delli Santi testified that she was 
"terrified" to interview with prospective employers, "afraid" to 
network with people in the industry, and her social life nearly 
ceased to exist -- all because people might "find out" the 
alleged reason for her firing. 
         We stress our "severely limited" role in reviewing the 
question of whether the district court abused its discretion in 
remitting the pain and suffering award.  We "may disturb the 
district court's determination with respect to a remittitur only 
for abuse of discretion, and reverse and grant a new trial only 
if the verdict is so grossly excessive as to shock the judicial 
conscience."  Gumbs v. Pueblo Int'l., Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 771 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (internal quotes omitted); see also Williams v. Martin 
Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1038 (3d Cir. 1987) (court 
must "review a damage award to determine if it is rationally 
based"); Walters v. Mintec/Int'l., 758 F.2d 73, 82 (3d Cir. 1985) 
("a district court should be alert to its responsibility to see 
that jury awards do not extend beyond all reasonable bounds").  
Our role is even more limited than the district court's; we must 
give "additional deference" where the district court has already 
granted a remittitur.  Gumbs, 823 F.2d at 771.  In undertaking 
our circumscribed role, here, we find that a review of jury 
verdicts in other cases may prove helpful, though not mandatory.  
Id. at 773.   
         In Abrams, for instance, the jury awarded an employee 
$100,000 in damages for emotional distress under the LAD based 
upon his testimony that 
         it had been a very upsetting thing to be 
         accused in secret of bribery, to a company 
         that you've worked for, without even the 
         courtesy of being told about it. 
 
         It has been very unnerving, unpleasant and 
         distressing to have somebody tell you that 
         you can't have a job because you are not up 
         to it physically. . . . [a]nd I have really 
         been very, very, very upset by the whole 
         thing. 
 
841 F. Supp. at 593 (alteration in original).  The district 
court, however, ordered a remittitur, reasoning that, "[g]iven 
the paucity of evidence regarding plaintiff's actual mental 
distress," the award was grossly excessive to the extent it 
exceeded $2,500.  Id. at 594.  See Jackson v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 538 A.2d 1310, 1317 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) ("the 
severity of the distress from the testimony of the plaintiff 
himself was not of such a degree to warrant the judgment of over 
half a million dollars" in damages for emotional distress under 
the LAD); Catalane, 638 A.2d at 1353 (court upheld trial court's 
decision to grant new trial on damages under the LAD because 
$250,000 award for emotional distress "shocked the conscience" of 
the trial judge) (internal quote omitted).   
         Against this backdrop, we conclude that the district 
court acted within the confines of its discretion in ordering a 
new trial unless Delli Santi accepted a remittitur of $295,000.  
Although Delli Santi testified about her distress, the district 
court determined that Delli Santi's evidence of pain and 
suffering did not support an award of $300,000.  Because we must 
give deference to the judgment of the trial court who was "in the 
best position to evaluate the evidence and assess whether the 
jury's verdict [was] rationally based", Gumbs, 823 F.2d at 772 
(quoting Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 
1979)), we cannot say that the district court exceeded the bounds 
of its discretion in remitting the pain and suffering award from 
$300,000 to $5,000. 
 
                                V. 
         Finally, Delli Santi argues that the district court 
should have submitted the issue of punitive damages to the 
jury.  We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
decision to deny Delli Santi's request to send the issue of 
punitive damages to the jury.  Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
477 U.S. 908 (1986); Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1167.   
         "The New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that `[t]o 
warrant a punitive award, the defendant's conduct must have been 
wantonly reckless or malicious.  There must be an intentional 
wrongdoing in the sense of an `evil minded act' or an act 
accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard for the rights of 
another.'"  Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1192 (quoting Nappe v. 
Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1230 (N.J. 
1984)) (alteration in original); accord Jackson, 538 A.2d at 
1319-20.  As we noted in Levinson, 868 F.2d at 563, however, "we 
do not suggest that in every employment discrimination case in 
which there is a basis for compensatory damages it follows that 
punitive damages are also available."  See Catalane, 638 A.2d at 
1354 ("punitive damages are only to be awarded in exceptional 
cases even where the LAD has been violated"); Maczik v. Gifford 
Park Yacht Club, 638 A.2d 1322, 1326 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) 
("Punitive damages . . . are distinct from compensatory damages, 
require a greater threshold basis, and are assessed only when the 
wrongdoer's conduct is `especially egregious.'"); Weiss v. Parker 
Hannifan Corp., 747 F. Supp. 1118, 1136 (D.N.J. 1990) ("plaintiff 
must show more than the minimum conduct necessary to prove the 
underlying [LAD claim] before an award of punitive damages 
becomes appropriate"); Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 
445, 464 (N.J. 1993) (punitive damages are to be awarded "when 
the wrongdoers conduct is especially egregious") (citing 
Leigruber v. Claridge Assocs., 375 A.2d 652 (N.J. 1977)).  Butsee Johnson 
v. Ryder Truck Rentals Inc., 624 A.2d 632, 635 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) ("no proofs other than a violation of 
the [LAD] are required to warrant the imposition of punitive 
damages").  Although we conclude there is sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict for compensatory damages, we do not 
perceive any basis to interfere with the district court's 
reasoning that there was a lack of evidence to submit the issue 
of punitive damages to the jury. 
 
                               VI. 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the district 
court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of CNA and, 
in addition, reverse the district court's conditional grant of a 
new trial on liability issues.  We will affirm the district 
court's decision to grant a new trial on the issue of damages 
unless Delli Santi accepts the remittitur, but we will reinstate 
the jury's award of $152,266 representing damages for loss of 
future earnings.  On remand the district court should consider 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
         I concur in the judgment except insofar as it 
reinstates the jury's award of front pay.  I agree with the 
majority that a reasonable jury could have found that CNA would 
not have launched its investigation of the plaintiff's gasoline 
vouchers were it not for her complaints of discrimination.  Both 
the timing of the investigation and CNA's failure to investigate 
other employees who reported low gasoline mileage give rise to an 
inference of retaliation.  I recognize that, of the low-mileage 
employees, the plaintiff's record was apparently one of, if not 
the very, worst, and this is certainly a fact that I would have 
taken into account if I had been the trier of fact.  
Nevertheless, I think that, even assuming that the plaintiff bore 
the burden of persuasion with respect to the question whether 
retaliation was a determinative factor in the discharge decision 
(a question I discuss below), a reasonable jury could have found 
that it was.  
         A reasonable jury could not have found, however, that 
the plaintiff did not falsify her vouchers.  Driving a compact 
car with an EPA-estimated gas mileage of 23 miles per gallon, she 
reported gas mileage, over a five-year period, that was far, far 
lower, reaching a nadir of three miles per gallon for one 
reporting period.  She offered a host of excuses for her low 
mileage, but these were either inherently dubious or were 
discredited by CNA's investigation.  For example, although the 
plaintiff suggested that her low mileage might be attributable to 
mechanical problems with her car (she said that the car "ran 
rough"), when the car was test driven it achieved 24 to 27 miles 
per gallon.  Most damning was the plaintiff's submission of 
"receipts" for gas purchases that she herself wrote up.  The 
mileage that she reported for particular periods was inversely 
proportional to the number of these suspicious "receipts" that 
she submitted.  In 1984, when she submitted an average of two to 
three such "receipts" per expense period, her reported mileage 
was 11 to 13 miles per gallon.  In 1985, she submitted an average 
of three to four such "receipts" per period, and her mileage sank 
to 10 miles per gallon.  In 1986, when she averaged four such 
"receipts" per period, her mileage fell further to 7 miles per 
gallon.  And finally, in 1987, when she reached an average of 
five such "receipts" per period, her mileage plummeted to 6 miles 
per gallon.  As the district court observed, the proof of the 
plaintiff's pilfering was "overwhelming." 
         A reasonable jury likewise could not have found that 
CNA did not have a policy of firing employees who were proven to 
have stolen from the company.  Employers do not routinely 
tolerate employees who are proven to have stolen from them; CNA 
offered evidence that it had a blanket policy of firing such 
employees; and I am aware of no direct evidence to the contrary.  
The majority suggests, however, that the absence of such a policy 
can be inferred from the fact that CNA approved the plaintiff's 
expense reports for some time without launching an investigation 
and the fact that CNA did not investigate other employees who 
reported very low mileage.  This reasoning overlooks the 
important difference between the failure to investigate 
suspicious conduct, which may result from lax administrative 
controls, and the toleration of proven theft.  Once the plaintiff 
was investigated, CNA was confronted with what the district court 
aptly described as "overwhelming" proof of her theft.  In my 
judgment, a reasonable jury could not have inferred from CNA's 
failure to investigate suspicious conduct that it was CNA's 
policy to tolerate proven theft. 
         Because it is CNA's policy to fire employees, such as 
the plaintiff, who are caught stealing from the company, the 
plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement or front pay.  In 
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S.Ct. 879 
(1995), the Supreme Court held that an employer who discharges an 
employee for a discriminatory reason is liable under the federal 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act even though the employer 
discovers after the action is taken that it has a different, 
legitimate reason for the same action.  The Court observed, 
however, that in such a case "as a general rule . . .  neither 
reinstatement nor front pay is appropriate."  Id. at 886.  The 
Court explained: "It would be both inequitable and pointless to 
order the reinstatement of someone the employer would have 
terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful 
grounds."  Id.  I think that this teaching would be controlling 
here if this case rested on federal rather than state law.   
         The majority, however, facilely dismisses the teaching 
of McKennon as applicable only in "after-acquired" evidence 
cases, that is, cases in which the evidence of the legitimate 
reason for discharge is acquired after the adverse employment 
decision is taken.  This reasoning does not seem to me to make 
any sense.  Consider the following two cases.  In Case A, which 
is analogous to McKennon, the employer discharges an employee for 
a discriminatory reason and then, when sued or threatened with 
suit, launches an investigation of the employee and discovers a 
legitimate reason for discharge.  In Case B, which is comparable 
to this case, the same employer, acting with the same 
discriminatory motive, targets the same employee for 
investigation before firing him and then discovers, as a result 
of the investigation, the same legitimate ground for termination.  
In Case A, the employee, under McKennon, would not be entitled to 
reinstatement or front pay, and I cannot think of any good reason 
for treating the employee in Case B more favorably than the 
employee in Case A. 
         While McKennon is not directly controlling here because 
this case is based on the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
("LAD") rather than federal anti-discrimination law, I think that 
the New Jersey Supreme Court would follow McKennon, see Miller v. 
Beneficial Management Corp., 855 F. Supp. 691, 715-17 (D.N.J. 
1994); Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel and Casino, 828 F. Supp. 
314, 324 (D.N.J. 1993), or would adopt some related rule limiting 
a plaintiff's entitlement to reinstatement or front pay in cases 
where a legitimate reason for discharge is discovered after the 
employee is wrongfully terminated or targeted for investigation.  
(In an extreme case -- say, the investigation uncovers, not petty 
chiselling on expense vouchers, but massive embezzlement -- 
ordering reinstatement or front pay would be preposterous.)   
         One other aspect of the majority opinion bears comment.  
The majority appears to hold that the standards set out in 
Jamison v. Rockaway Township Bd. of Educ., 242 N.J. Super. 436,    
445, 577 A.2d 177, 182 (App. Div. 1990), apply in all LAD 
retaliation cases.  Jamison itself, however, takes pains to limit 
its holding to cases involving the failure to promote, see    
N.J. Super. at 446-47, 577 A.2d at 182-83 and the plaintiff 
argues strenuously that it does not apply here.  While it may be 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court will ultimately hold that 
Jamison governs all LAD retaliation cases, it has not done so 
yet, and I see no need for us to venture a prediction on this 
question, because I think that the result here would be the same 
whether Jamison applies or not.  
         Under Jamison, as I understand it, once the employer 
satisfies its burden of production under the second step of the 
McDonnell Douglas scheme, the plaintiff must then show that 
retaliation was a motivating factor in the challenged action, not 
that it was the sole or a determinative cause.  Then, the 
burden of persuasion switches to the employer to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that retaliation was not a 
determinative cause.    
         Under the federal scheme, which I take it would apply 
if Jamison does not, see McKenna v. Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 
820 (3rd Cir. 1994), once the employer satisfies its burden of 
production under the second step of McDonnell Douglas, and 
assuming the case does not call for special treatment under Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), it would then be up 
to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, 
using direct or indirect proof, that retaliation was a 
determinative cause of the challenged action.  See Miller v. 
CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 598 (3rd Cir. 1995) (in banc).  Thus, 
the difference between the two schemes concerns the allocation of 
the risk of non-persuasion on the question whether retaliation 
was a determinative cause.  In this case, I think that whoever 
had that burden, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the 
investigation was begun for a retaliatory reason and was thus a 
determinative cause of the plaintiff's termination.  Accordingly, 
it seems to me to be both unnecessary and imprudent for this 
panel to make a prediction on this point.                          
                  
 
 
